Enterprise: Admin-Guarded Actions

Problem Statement

Certain enterprise operations (changing billing plans, modifying security settings, enabling integrations) require administrative privileges. These actions must declare their permission requirements so agents don't attempt unauthorized operations.

Why Human-Only Semantics Fail

• Admin-only buttons look identical to regular buttons
• Permission requirements are enforced server-side with no client-side declaration
• Role hierarchies (viewer < editor < admin < super-admin) aren't in the DOM
• Failed permission checks return generic "Forbidden" errors

Why Scraping Fails Here

• Admin UI sections may be entirely absent from non-admin DOM
• Permission checks happen via API, not DOM visibility
• Multi-factor authentication gates are JavaScript-driven
• Admin panels often have different URL structures

How AXAG Eliminates Scraping

Admin-guarded actions declare axag-required-roles and axag-preconditions with specific permission requirements. Agents check role compatibility before attempting the action.

Annotated UI Example

<!-- Change Billing Plan -->
<button
  axag-intent="billing.change_plan"
  axag-entity="billing"
  axag-action-type="write"
  axag-required-parameters='["plan_id"]'
  axag-optional-parameters='["billing_cycle","promo_code"]'
  axag-preconditions='["caller must have billing_admin role","account must not have past-due invoices"]'
  axag-postconditions='["plan changed","prorated charges applied","confirmation email sent"]'
  axag-risk-level="critical"
  axag-confirmation-required="true"
  axag-approval-required="true"
  axag-approval-roles='["super_admin"]'
  axag-idempotent="true"
  axag-side-effects='["billing_change","proration","email_notification"]'
  axag-scope="tenant"
  axag-description="Change the organization's billing plan"
>Change Plan</button>

<!-- Disable MFA (Security Setting) -->
<button
  axag-intent="security.disable_mfa"
  axag-entity="security_settings"
  axag-action-type="write"
  axag-required-parameters='["user_id"]'
  axag-preconditions='["caller must have security_admin role","MFA must be currently enabled"]'
  axag-postconditions='["MFA disabled for user","security audit log updated"]'
  axag-risk-level="critical"
  axag-confirmation-required="true"
  axag-approval-required="true"
  axag-approval-roles='["security_admin","super_admin"]'
  axag-idempotent="true"
  axag-side-effects='["security_posture_change","audit_log"]'
  axag-scope="tenant"
  axag-description="Disable multi-factor authentication for a user"
>Disable MFA</button>

Semantic Manifest Excerpt

{
  "intent": "billing.change_plan",
  "entity": "billing",
  "operation_id": "billing_change_plan",
  "action_type": "write",
  "parameters": {
    "plan_id": { "type": "string", "required": true },
    "billing_cycle": { "type": "string", "required": false, "enum": ["monthly","annual"] },
    "promo_code": { "type": "string", "required": false }
  },
  "preconditions": [
    "caller must have billing_admin role",
    "account must not have past-due invoices"
  ],
  "postconditions": [
    "plan changed",
    "prorated charges applied",
    "confirmation email sent"
  ],
  "risk_level": "critical",
  "confirmation_required": true,
  "approval_required": true,
  "approval_roles": ["super_admin"],
  "idempotent": true,
  "side_effects": ["billing_change", "proration", "email_notification"],
  "scope": "tenant"
}

Constraints & Safety Notes

• Critical risk: billing changes have immediate financial impact
• Dual gate: requires both confirmation AND approval from a super_admin
• Agents MUST check preconditions before attempting: verify role, verify no past-due invoices
• Disabling MFA is a security-sensitive operation that logs to audit trail
• Both actions are idempotent (changing to the same plan, disabling already-disabled MFA)
• approval_roles declares WHO can approve, not just that approval is needed